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Abstract
We present a computational semantics of communicative actions for rational agent
programming languages. Three indicators are used to differentiate declarative, in-
terrogative and imperative messages which replace the usual labels to identify so-
called speech acts. We introduce a multi-agent veriﬁcation logic based on the com-
putational semantics that facilitates reasoning about communicative actions. Sub-
sequently, this multi-agent logic is embedded into a more expressive modal logic
over a run-based semantics. We relate both logics and prove expressivity results.
Finally, we show how the modal logic can be used to characterize communicative
actions as particular speech acts and allows to verify communication among ratio-
nal agents.
1 Introduction
We introduce a computational semantics for communicative actions based on mental
models. A shift is made from the traditional speech-act based labels to the exchange
of messages differentiated only by grammatical markers. Three markers corresponding
to the three sentence types declarative, interrogative, and imperative, which are also
distinguished in natural language grammar, are introduced. We believe the notion of a
speech act is best used descriptively to characterize message exchanges between agents.
The semantics is designed such that it is particularly easy to integrate it into agent
programming languages that facilitate programming with mental models (e.g. [10, 1,
4]), where a mental model consists of the declarative beliefs and goals of an agent. To
this end, a transition semantics is introduced that provides a recipe for implementing
communication between such agents. The motivation for the approach presented thus is
pragmatic in the sense that it should provide useful communication primitives for pro-
gramming agents. In this paper we extend the veriﬁcation logic for single GOAL agents
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to a logic that can be used to reason about communicating GOAL agents. We then
continue to show that this semantics can be embedded into a modal semantics, similar
to that of message-passing systems introduced in [7]. This result can be seen as a con-
servative extension of the single-agent result presented in [10] to the multi-agent setting
introduced here; however, in this paper we left out some operators whose addition is
straightforward. The operational semantics does not introduce speech acts, which has
been the dominating perspective in agent communication, but the logic can be used to
reason about communicating agents and we show that communicated messages can be
classiﬁed as speech acts by means of this logic.
Section 2 introduces the basic multi-agent model presupposed by both the transi-
tion as well as the modal semantics. Section 3 introduces the essentials of an agent
programming language on top of which Section 4 adds a computational semantics for
communicative actions. We also introduce a logic based on the transition semantics.
Section 5 embeds this semantics into a modal semantics. The modal logic is used in
Section 6 to characterize message exchanges as speech acts. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Preliminaries: The Multi-Agent Model
The multi-agent model, which is based on the (interpreted) systems model from [7],
assumes a ﬁxed number of agents with associated agent names Agt = {a1,...,an}.
This assumption is not essential here but simpliﬁes the technical presentation. A global
state g of a multi-agent system (MAS) is a tuple hla1,...,lan,lei with lai the local state
of agent ai and le the state of the environment. We use ga to denote the local state of
agent a. The non-empty set G = La1 × ... × Lan × Le represents all (global) states.
In each state an agent a may perform an action, drawn from a set of actions Acta. We
use αi to denote actions and assume that Acta contains an action Λ which corresponds
to agent a performing no action. Without loss of generality, we assume that Acta ∩
Actb = ∅ when a 6= b. Act denotes the union of the action sets of all agents. As we
abstract from the details of action selection here, we associate mappings Pa : La →
P(Acta) called programs with each agent that map a local state to a non-empty set of
actions from which the agent may nondeterministically select an action to perform. An
agent may then be deﬁned as a pair ha,Pai with a ∈ Agt and Pa a program. Usually,
we identify an agent with its name.
The effects of performing an action are represented by a transition function τ : G ×
Act → G. Actions are assumed to update only the local state of the agent performing
it. That is, τ(g,α)a = ga whenever α 6∈ Acta. An exception to this rule will be made
below for communicative actions.
The behavior of a multi-agent system is given by a run r which is a mapping N →
G × Act. r1(i) (resp. r2(i)) is used to denote the projection of r(i) onto the ﬁrst
(resp. second) component of r(i). We thus use an interleaving semantics to model the
execution of a MAS. This means that for every i we have r2(i) ∈ Pa(ga) for some
a ∈ Agt where ga = (r1(i))a and r1(i + 1) = τ(r(i)). Additional constraints such as
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fairness may be added but are not studied in this paper.
Deﬁnition 1 (MAS Model) A multi-agent system model R, system for short, is deﬁned
as a set of runs.
3 Programming with Mental Models
In this section we brieﬂy introduce the essential notions used to deﬁne a GOAL multi-
agent system. Multi-agent GOAL extends the single agent GOAL framework in various
ways. A mental state of an agent in a multi-agent system is a more complex entity made
up of mental models that are associated with each agent in the system. What we call a
mental model here corresponds to a mental state of a GOAL agent in the single agent
setting (cf. [10]). Finally, the set of built-in actions is extended with a communication
primitive and three markers to indicate the type of sentence that is contained within the
message.
GOAL rational agents are programs that derive their choice of action from their be-
liefs and goals. The GOAL agent programming language provides a framework for
programming with mental models that consist of an agent’s beliefs and goals. Whereas
in the single agent setting (see e.g. [6]) a mental model consists of the agent’s own
beliefs and goals only, in the multi-agent setting, that we consider here, we introduce
the notion of a mental state that consists of mental models of other agents as well.
The idea is that these mental models are used to (partially) reconstruct the beliefs and
goals of another agent, given, for example, the messages received from that agent or
observations of other actions performed by that agent. Initially, before any message is
received or action is perceived, a mental model of another agent may already contain
information about that agent including, for example, beliefs that are considered com-
mon knowledge. In Section 4 we show how messages received from another agent may
be used to construct a mental model of that agent.
We reserve the label mental state for composed entities consisting of multiple men-
tal models, one for each agent in the MAS, and the label mental model for pairs of
beliefs and goals associated with a particular agent. A mental state of an agent thus
is a mapping from agent names to mental models. The beliefs and goals of an agent
are declarative sentences which are represented in some underlying knowledge repre-
sentation technology. Here we assume a propositional language LPL built from a set of
propositional atoms Atom and the usual boolean connectives. This language is shared
between agents and the vocabulary used to communicate are aligned.1 |=PL denotes
the usual consequence relation associated with LPL, and the special symbol ⊥ ∈ LPL
denotes the false proposition. As is common [4, 10], some additional rationality con-
straints are imposed on a mental model.
1Our primary interest here is to introduce a computational semantics for communicating agents and to
characterize message exchanges between agents in a logic that provides the means to reason about commu-
nicating agents. Other issues such as the alignment of vocabularies which may arise in open agent systems
are not addressed in this paper.
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Deﬁnition 2 (Mental Models and Mental States) AmentalmodelisapairhΣ,Γiwith
Σ ⊆ LPL a belief and Γ ⊆ LPL a goal base which satisfy the following rationality con-
straints:
• The belief base is consistent: Σ 6|=PL ⊥;
• Individual goals are consistent: ∀γ ∈ Γ : γ 6|=PL ⊥;
• Goals are not believed to be achieved: ∀γ ∈ Γ : Σ 6|=PL γ.
A mental state is a mapping m from Agt to mental models, i.e. m(a) = hΣ,Γi is a
mental model for each a ∈ Agt. The set of all mental states is denoted by MS(Agt).
The intuition is that a mental state ma encodes a’s beliefs about b’s beliefs and goals
by mapping agent name b to a mental model ma(b) = hΣ,Γi where Σ encodes b’s be-
liefs and Γ encodes b’s goals. Agent a’s beliefs about agent b do not have to correspond
with the actual mental state of agent b, i.e. it may be the case that ma(b) 6= mb(b)
where mb denotes the mental state of agent b. Agent a’s private belief and goal bases
are accessed by ma(a). A mental state thus allows for second-order beliefs but not
higher-order beliefs as we want to ensure the model is both tractable as well as a useful
extension of current agent programming languages. To ensure this we need to make a
trade-off between expressivity and computational complexity here. As a consequence,
in the model proposed, we cannot have, for example, that an agent believes that another
agent either believes φ or believes ¬φ.
Mental states are concrete instantiations of the local states of Section 2 and we get
G = MSa1 × ... × MSan where MSai denotes the set of mental states for agent ai.
Agents need to be able to inspect their mental state and the different mental models
part of it. In order to do so we introduce belief (Ba) and goal modalities (Ga) which
are annotated with agent names in order to refer to the beliefs and goals, respectively,
in the mental model associated with agent a. Formulae of the form Baφ and Gaφ are
called mental atoms which may be combined into composed sentences called mental
state conditions using the boolean connectives conjunction ∧ and negation ¬.
Deﬁnition 3 (Mental State Conditions) The language of mental state conditions over
Agt, LMS(Agt), is deﬁned by:
ψ ::= Baφ | Gaφ | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ
where a ∈ Agt and φ ∈ LPL.
The semantics of mental state conditions is deﬁned relative to a mental state. The
truth of Bbφ in a mental state ma of agent a denotes that agent a believes that agent b
believes φ, and, similarly, Gbφ denotes that a believes b has goal φ. That agent a has
these beliefs is left implicit in an agent program as this program provides the context in
which to evaluate a mental state condition. In case a = b and Baφ (resp. Gaφ) is true
we simply say that agent a believes (resp. has goal) φ.
Deﬁnition 4 (Semantics of LMS) Let m be a mental state and m(a) = hΣa,Γai. The
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semantics of LMS is deﬁned by:
m |=MS Baφ iff Σa |=PL φ
m |=MS Gaφ iff ∃γ ∈ Γa such that γ |=PL φ
m |=MS ¬ψ iff m 6|=MS ψ
m |=MS ψ ∧ ψ0 iff m |=MS ψ and m |=MS ψ0
A GOAL agent selects actions by means of action rules. As the details of action
selection are not important in this paper, we abstract away from the speciﬁcs and instead
useanagentprogramprga : MSa → P(Act)whichareabstractmappingsfrommental
states to non-empty sets of actions.2 Then, we may consider a GOAL agent as a tuple
ha,prgai where a is an agent name and prga an agent program for agent a. We will
often identify an agent with his name.
The behavior of an agent is determined by its mental state. The transition functions τ
of Section 2 therefore will also be called mental state transformers; a corresponding run
is also called a(n) (agent) trace. As a mental state transformer has type MS × Act →
MS, τ(g,α)a(b) must satisfy the constraints from Deﬁnition 2 for any a,b ∈ Agt.
Here, τ(g,α) denotes a global state, τ(g,α)a denotes the mental state of agent a, and
τ(g,α)a(b) denotes the mental model agent a associates with agent b, a notation we
will often use below.
4 Communicating Agents
Actions have been deﬁned abstractly as mental state transformers that affect an agent’s
own mental state. The communicative actions that we introduce here affect the mental
state of the receiving agent and may be viewed as complementary to actions that act
upon the environment and are useful in a multi-agent context to affect other agents. A
communicative action is of the form send(a,b,msg) ∈ Acta where msg denotes a
message that is being sent by agent a to agent b. This differs from the traditional ap-
proach based on speech act theory, where such actions are of the form send(a,b,label,
msg) where label identiﬁes the type of speech act performed (e.g. inform, query, etc.;
see e.g. [11, 8, 13]) and msg denotes the message content.3 The labels available are
different for each particular approach (compare e.g. KQML and FIPA). As has been
discussed extensively in the literature, one of the main problems, extensively discussed
in the literature, concerns the use of speech-act identifying labels as part of the message
sent. It is, for example, not possible for the receiving agent to verify that the label used
to identify the speech act performed corresponds to the act that is actually performed
by the sending agent (cf. [15]). For example, agent a may use the label inform when
sending a message with content φ, which requires at least a belief that φ is true on the
part of agent a according to traditional speech act theory, whereas in fact agent a does
2In [7] agent programs correspond to protocols.
3In most practical approaches additional parameters are allowed which do not concern us here.
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not believe φ to be true at all. As agents do not have direct access to the mental states
of other agents, it is impossible for agent b to verify such conditions.4
To avoid such problems, we do not use speech-act labels but instead use indicators
to identify the sentence type. Three indicators are introduced that intuitively correspond
with the sentence types most often used in natural language: • for declarative, ? for
interrogative, and ! for imperative sentences. A message then is of the form iφ where i
is one of the three indicators.
Deﬁnition 5 (Message) The set Msg of messages consists of all messages of the form
•φ, ?φ, or !φ where φ ∈ LPL.
Semantically, a shift from the focus on the sender to the hearer is proposed. It is
natural that upon receiving a message an agent will update its mental state. The main
question then is how? Taking as our example a message •φ with declarative indicator,
different options are available: The receiving agent (i) incorporates φ into its own be-
liefs, (ii) comes to believe that the sender believes φ, or (iii) comes to believe the sender
intended the receiving agent to believe φ. Other, less useful options, are ignored here.5
We take a deﬁnite engineering stance here as our main interest is in providing useful
communicationprimitivesforprogrammingmulti-agentsystemswhichalsocorrespond
with basic common sense intuitions. Taking a pragmatic engineering perspective as our
starting point, we argue that: option (i) is too strong as it introduces the assumption that
the sender always convinces the receiver, and (iii) is too weak as it is no longer very
clear what use the communication has and quite complex reasoning patterns would be
needed to conclude something useful from such indirect information about the sender’s
mental state.6 This leaves option (ii) which, although it may not always be safe, instead
only makes the assumption that the sender believes what it says and arguably takes a
message at its face value. Obviously, this is not always a safe assumption to make as
the sender may be lying. However, it is also not overly presumptuous as the agent just
takes the utterance of the sender at face value. This choice also seems reasonable as
a default way to handle messages from the pragmatic perspective of the well-known
Gricean maxims. For example, the Maxim of Quality, which instructs to not say what
4The point we are making here does not concern the fact that agents lack certain epistemic abilities. As-
suming that agents are autonomous and do not have access to other agents’ mental states, it is not realistic
to suppose agents would have such capabilities. The point is rather that an agent is not able to distinguish
between the particular act that is being performed and others; in the example in the main text, the receiv-
ing agent without additional knowledge would not be able to distinguish whether the sending agent is, for
example, informing, misinforming, or lying.
5Of course, there are still other options, one of which is the rather extreme option of ignoring all mes-
sages, which would make all communication effort redundant. As we are most interested in providing useful
communication primitives for programming multi-agent systems, the option of ignoring received messages
completely is not considered here.
6Option (iii) is unsatisfactory as it seems mainly motivated by the idea that an agent should avoid making
too strong assumptions at any cost instead of taking a message at its face value. In practice, using this type
of semantics as a default would be rather similar to doing nothing with a received message as making good
use of information about the intentions of another agent would require rather involved reasoning patterns.
In particular, in the context of agent programming, it seems reasonable to conclude that using option (iii) to
deﬁne a semantics would be too involved to be useful and not worth the effort.
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you believe to be false, or for which you lack adequate evidence, may be viewed as
supporting the view that taking messages at face value as option (ii) would provide an
adequate default to interpret a message without information to the contrary. Finally, the
mental models of other agents maintained by each agent and introduced above become
particularly useful here again as a means to deﬁne the semantics of communication.
Wecontinuetoformalizetheinformaldiscussionabovebyextendingthementalstate
transformer τ such that it can be applied to send(a,b,iφ) actions as well. In order to
simplify the presentation, we assume that whenever a message is sent it is immediately
received and processed by the recipient.
Deﬁnition 6 (Message-Passing MST) A message-passing mental state transformer τ :
G × Act → G satisﬁes:
• if b 6= a, α ∈ Acta, α 6= send(a,b,m), then τ(g,α)b = gb
• if α = send(a,b,m), then (i) τ(g,α)i = gi ∀i ∈ Agt \ {b},
(ii) τ(g,α)b(i) = gb(i) ∀i ∈ Agt \ {a}, and
τ(g,α)b(a) :=

 
 
hΣa ⊕ φ,{γ ∈ Γa | Σa ⊕ φ 6|= γ}i if m = •φ
hΣa ª φ,Γai if m = ?φ
hΣa ª φ,Γa ∪ {φ}i if m = !φ
Communicating a message m thus modiﬁes the mental model hΣa,Γai of the sender a
maintained by receiver b as follows:
1. When m is a declarative, φ is added to the belief base Σa to represent the belief
of agent b that a believes φ. The addition of φ to Σa is modelled by ⊕, where we
minimally assume that Σa ⊕ φ |=PL φ when φ is consistent. Moreover, we have
to remove goals which are satisﬁed wrt. the updated belief base in order to meet
the third rationality constraint from Def. 2.
2. When m is an interrogative, φ is removed from the belief base Σa to represent
the belief that agent a does not believe φ when it asks a question ?φ. The removal
of φ from Σa is modelled by ª, where we minimally assume that Σa ªφ 6|=PL φ
when φ is not a tautology.
3. When m is an imperative, and φ is not a tautology, then it is added to the goal
base Γa to represent the belief that agent a wants φ when it communicates !φ and
φ is removed from the belief base Σa to represent the belief that agent a does not
believe φ when it wants φ (cf. Deﬁnition 2).
The Veriﬁcation Language LV. The temporal language LV to reason about commu-
nicating agents is an extension of the veriﬁcation logic introduced in [10]7. In the logic
we need to refer to the beliefs an agent has about the beliefs and goals of another agent,
7Apart from the global modality [α] referring to action executions which is left out in this paper.
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and therefore, a superscript is added to the belief and goal modalities where Bb
aφ rep-
resents that a believes that b believes φ, and, similarly, Gb
aφ represents that a believes
that b has goal φ.
Deﬁnition 7 (Veriﬁcation Language LV) LV(Agt,LPL,Msg) denotes the set of for-
mulae χ deﬁned by the following grammar:
χ ::= start | Bb
aφ | Gb
aφ | ¬χ | χ ∧ χ | χUχ | Xϕ | donea(α)
where φ ∈ LPL, α ∈ Act a and a,b ∈ Agt. We also write Ba for Ba
a and Ga for Ga
a.
A trace generated by several goal agents and a message passing mental state trans-
former serves as a model for LV. Given such a trace and a time point, the semantics of
LV-formulae is deﬁned in a straightforward way.
Deﬁnition 8 (Semantics of LV) The semantics of LV-formulae is deﬁned relative to a
trace t and a time point i ∈ N:
t,i |=V Bb
aφ iff ga |=MS Bbφ where g = t1(i)
t,i |=V Gb
aφ iff ga |=MS Gbφ where g = t1(i)
t,i |=V ¬χ iff t,i 6|=V χ
t,i |=V χ ∧ χ0 iff t,i |=V χ and t,i |=V χ0
t,i |=V Xχ iff t,i + 1 |=V χ
t,i |=V χUχ0 iff ∃j ≥ i : t,j |=V χ0 and
∀k : i ≤ k < j ⇒ t,k |=V χ
t,i |=V donea(α) iff i > 0 and t2(i − 1) = α
5 Embedding LV in the Modal Logic LM
In this section we introduce the modal logic LM which is used to reason about runs.
Then, we relate the veriﬁcation logic LV and its semantics to the modal logic LM and
present expressiveness results.
5.1 LM: Syntax and Semantics
The language LM is built from atoms p ∈ Atom and the temporal constructs g ϕ for ϕ
holds in the next state, ϕUψ for ϕ holds until ψ holds, belief operators Baϕ for a ∈ Agt
believes ϕ, goal operators Gaϕ for a has goal ϕ, and Donea(α) for a has performed
α ∈ Act.
Deﬁnition 9 (LM) The language LM is deﬁned by:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Baϕ | Gaϕ | g ϕ | ϕUψ | Donea(α)
The behavior of a MAS is modelled by a set of runs conform Section 2. In addition,
an LM-model consists of the usual belief and goal accessibility relations for each agent,
and a valuation which labels states with the facts true in it.
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Deﬁnition 10 (LM-Model) An LM-model M is a tuple hR,{Ba | a ∈ Agt},{Ga |
a ∈ Agt},V i where R is a set of runs over states G and actions Act, Ba,Ga ⊆
R × N × R × N are serial belief and goal accessibility relations, respectively, and
V : R × N → P(Atom) is a valuation function, which assigns to each point the
propositional atoms true in it.
Formulae are interpreted over LM-models in the standard way (see e.g. [7]). We use
M,r,i |= ϕ to denote that ϕ is satisﬁed on r at time i in model M.
Deﬁnition 11 (Semantics of LM) The semantics of LM-formulae over an LM-model
M, a run r ∈ RM, and a time point i ∈ N is deﬁned as follows:
M,r,i |= p iff p ∈ V (r,i)
M,r,i |= ¬ϕ iff M,r,i 6|= ϕ
M,r,i |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,r,i |= ϕ and M,r,i |= ψ
M,r,i |= Baϕ iff ∀(r0,i0) ∈ Ba(r,i) : M,r0,i0 |= ϕ
M,r,i |= Gaϕ iff ∀(r0,i0) ∈ Ga(r,i) : M,r0,i0 |= ϕ
M,r,i |= g ϕ iff M,r,i + 1 |= ϕ
M,r,i |= ϕUψ iff ∃j : j ≥ i and M,r,j |= ψ s.t. ∀k : i ≤ k < j ⇒ M,r,k |= ϕ
M,r,i |= Donea(α) iff i > 0 and r2(i − 1) = α ∈ Acta
We deﬁne Xa(r,i) = {(r0,i0) | Xa(r,i,r0,i0)} for X ∈ {B,G} and, as usual, abbrevi-
ate Baϕ ∧ ϕ as Kaϕ.
5.2 Equivalence and Correspondence Results
We formally relate the logics LV and LM by embedding LV into LM. We do so by
introducing a translation tr from LV-formulae to LM-formulae and showing that this
translation preserves truth. This shows that LM can be used to reason about commu-
nicating agents instead of the non-standard LV (moreover, in a much more expressive
way), which is not only useful as standard techniques for modal logic can be applied
but also because it allows us to study expressiveness of LV compared to LM.
First, we deﬁne the syntactic translation of formulae.
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Deﬁnition 12 (Translation tr : LV → LM)
tr(Bb
aφ) =
(
BaBbφ if a 6= b
Baφ if a = b
tr(Gb
aφ) =
(
BaGb♦φ if a 6= b
Ga♦φ if a = b
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ψ)
tr(Xϕ) = g tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕUφ) = tr(ϕ)Utr(ψ)
tr(donea(α)) = Donea(α)
Our ﬁrst result shows that LM and its models are at least as expressive as LV over
traces; i.e., the modal logic can be used to reason about traces.
Theorem 1 Let t be a trace. Then there is an LM-model M = hR,{Ba | a ∈
Agt},{Ga | a ∈ Agt},V i and a run rt ∈ R such that for all ϕ ∈ LV and i ∈ N
we have: t,i |=V ϕ iff M,rt,i |= tr(ϕ).
Proof. (Sketch) Let Π(T) := {π ⊆ Atom | π |=PL T} denote the set of all valuations
that makeT ⊆ LPL true. The set ofruns R is deﬁnedoverstatesG := La1×...×Lan×
Le. We set Le := P(Atom) and La := MSa for a ∈ Agt. The run rt corresponding to
trace t is simply deﬁned by: rt
2(i) := t2(i), (rt
1(i))e := ∅, and (rt
1(i))a := (t1(i))a for
all i ∈ N, a ∈ Agt.
To obtain the belief and goal accessibility relations we deﬁne, similar to [10], a
set Rb of all “belief-reachable” runs (peak once runs). That is, Rb := {r | ∃!k :
(r1(k) 6= h∅,m∅,...m∅i),∀k : r2(k) = ²} where ² 6∈ Act and m∅ maps all agent
names to h∅,∅i. The belief accessibility relation for agent a is now deﬁned as follows:
Ba(r,i,r0,i0) iff (i) r0 ∈ Rb, (ii) i = i0, (iii) r0
e(i) ∈ Π(Σa) where (r1(i))a(a) =
hΣa,Γai, and (iv) ∀b ∈ Agt ((r0
1(i))b = (r1(i))a). That is, a run is Ba-reachable if
each local state lb represents a’s mental state (given in the run it is in relation with); and
the environment state is used to encode a’s beliefs about the world.
Let R({γ1,γ2,...},i) := {r | (r1(i + j))e ∈ Π({γj}),∀k ∈ N∀a ∈ Agt :
(r1(k))a = m∅}. Nowwedeﬁnethegoalaccessibilityrelationasfollows: Ga(r,i,r0,i0)
iff (i) i = i0 and (ii) r0 ∈ R(Γa,i) where (r1(i))a(a) = (Σa,Γa). That is, each “goal
run” contains one valuation for each goal in Γa at some future time point.
Finally, we set R := {rt} ∪ Rb ∪ Rg where Rg :=
S
X⊆LPL,i∈N R(X,i) and
V (r,i) := {p ∈ Atom | (r1(i))e |=PL p}. That t,i |=V ϕ iff M,rtf(t),i |= tr(ϕ) is
straightforwardly shown by structural induction on ϕ.
ϕ = ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ, Xφ, φUψ, donea(α): trivial;
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATICS 10COMMUNICATING RATIONAL AGENTS: SEMANTICS AND VERIFICATION
ϕ = Bb
aφ, a 6= b:
M,rt,i |= BaBbφ
iff ∀(r0,i) ∈ Ba(rt,i) : M,r0,i |= Bbφ
iff ∀(r0,i) ∈ Ba(rt,i) : (∀(r00,i) ∈ Bb(r0,i) :
M,r00,i |= φ
| {z }
iff V (r00,i)|=PLφ iff (r00
1 (i))e|=PLφ
)
iff ∀(r0,i) ∈ Ba(rt,i) :
∀π ∈ Π(Σb), (r0
1(i))b(b) = (Σb,Γb), π |=PL φ
iff ∀π ∈ Π(Σb), (rt
1(i))a(b) = (Σb,Γb), π |=PL φ
iff ∀π ∈ Π(Σb), (t1(i))a(b) = (Σb,Γb), π |=PL φ
iff (t1(i))a |=MS Bbφ iff t,i |=V Bb
aφ
ϕ = Ga
aφ:
M,rt,i |= Ga♦φ
iff ∀(r0,i) ∈ Ga(rt,i) : ∃j ≥ i(M,r0,j |= φ)
iff ∀(r0,i) : (r0 ∈ R(Γa,i), (rt
1(i))a(a) = (Σa,Γa) ⇒
∃j ≥ i(M,r0,j |= φ))
iff ∀(r0,i) : (r0 ∈ R(Γa,i), (rt
1(i))a(a) = (Σa,Γa) ⇒
∃j ≥ i(r0
1(j))e |=PL φ))
iff ∃γ ∈ Γa, (rt
1(i))a(a) = (Σa,Γa),
∀π ∈ Π({γ}) : (π |=PL φ)
iff (t1(i))a |=MS Gaφ
iff t,i |=V Gaφ
ϕ = Gb
aφ,Ba
aφ: analogously;

To obtain a correspondence result in the other direction, it is clear we need to im-
pose some constraints on LM-models to ensure they model mental states and meet the
conditions of Deﬁnition 2 and model communicative actions as in Deﬁnition 6. Firstly,
consider the rationality conditions of Deﬁnition 2. The ﬁrst two consistency conditions
aresatisﬁedbecauseoftheserialityofthebeliefandgoalrelations. Anadditionalpostu-
late is introduced to match the third condition. It is helpful to ﬁrst deﬁne some notation:
Bb
a(r,i) := (Bb ◦ Ba)(r,i) = {(r0,i0) | ∃(r00,i00) ∈ Ba(r,i) : (r0,i0) ∈ Bb(r00,i00)});
i.e. Bb
a(r,i) contains all points which are Bb-reachable from some point which is Ba-
reachable from (r,i); Gb
a := Gb ◦ Ba is deﬁned analogously. To match the third condi-
tion, we now introduce the following postulate:
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(R1) ∀a,b ∈ Agt : Gb
a(r,i) ⊆ [[♦ϕ]]M ⇒ Bb
a(r,i) 6⊆ [[ϕ]]M
where [[ϕ]]M := {(r,i) | M,r,i |= ϕ}, the denotation of ϕ, consists of the points that
satisfy ϕ. The subscript M is omited if clear from context.
In order to be able to match the communication semantics of Deﬁnition 6, two addi-
tional postulates are required. Let r be a run and X ∈ {B,G}. The following condition
says that only the beliefs and goals of an action executing agent may change provided
it is not a send action:
(R2) If send(·,·,msg) 6= r2(i) ∈ Acta then for all c,d ∈ Agt, c 6= a: Xc(r,i) =
Xc(r,i + 1) and Xd
c(r,i) = Xd
c(r,i + 1)
Our last postulate handles the case when a message is sent: Only the mental state of the
agent who receives the message is allowed to change in a prescribed way.
(R3) If r2(i) = send(a,b,msg) then for all c,d ∈ Agt: Xc(r,i) = Xc(r,i + 1) and
Xd
c(r,i) = Xd
c(r,i + 1) except if:
msg = •ϕ and ϕ consistent then Ba
b(r,i + 1) ⊆ [[ϕ]];
msg = ?ϕ and ϕ no tautology then Ba
b(r,i + 1) 6⊆ [[ϕ]];
msg = !ϕ and ϕ no tautology then Ba
b(r,i + 1) 6⊆ [[ϕ]] and Ga
b(r,i + 1) ⊆
Ga
b(r,i) ∩ [[♦ϕ]].
Note that in the case of •ϕ, (R1) ensures that ϕ is not a goal. Finally, we call a run
trace-consistent if it satisﬁes conditions (R1), (R2), and (R3) and an LM-model is said
to be trace-consistent if it contains at least one trace-consistent run.
Theorem 2 Let M be a trace-consistent LM-model. For each trace-consistent run r,
all ϕ ∈ LV, and i ∈ N, there is a trace t such that: M,r,i |= tr(ϕ) iff t,i |= ϕ.
Proof. (Sketch) Let M = (R,{Ba | a ∈ Agt},{Ga | a ∈ Agt},V ) and r ∈ R a
trace-consistent run. The trace t is deﬁned from r as follows. For all i ∈ N we set (1)
t2(i) := r2(i) and (2) for all a,b ∈ Agt we set (t1(i))a(b) := hΣb
a,Γb
ai where for a 6=
b: Σb
a := {φ ∈ LPL | M,r,i |= BaBbφ}, Γb
a := {φ ∈ LPL | M,r,i |= BaGb♦φ}; and
for a = b: Σa
a := {φ ∈ LPL | M,r,i |= Baφ}, Γa
a := {φ ∈ LPL | M,r,i |= Ga♦φ}.
The following claims complete the proof.
Claim 1: t is a trace. Proof: That each element of t1(i) is consistent is ensured by
the seriality of the belief relations. Assume some Σa is inconsistent. Then there are
ϕ,ψ ∈ Σa such that ϕ ∧ ψ is inconsistent. Then, M,r,i |= Ba(ϕ ∧ ψ) and thus also
M,r,i |= Ba⊥ which contradicts the seriality of Ba. Following the same reasoning,
we get that each goal contained in any goal base must be consistent. Finally, that goals
are not believed is ensured by postulate (R1). Assume that M,r,i |= Ga♦γ ∧ Baγ,
then we would have Ba(r,i) ⊆ [[γ]] and Ga(r,i) ⊆ [[♦γ]], which is a contradiction. It
remains to show that t satisﬁes the conditions imposed by Def. 6. For actions other
than communicative actions postulate (R2) guarantees that only the mental state of the
agent that performs it is affected. For a communicative act, assume that t2(i − 1) =
send(a,b,msg) and let (t1(i − 1))b(a) = hΣa,Γai and (t1(i))b(a) = hΣ0
a,Γ0
ai.
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Case msg = •ψ: For consistent ψ, we show that Σ0
a |=PL ψ. Assume this is not
the case, i.e. M,r,i 6|= BbBaψ. This is equivalent to ¬(∀(r0,i0) ∈ Bb(r,i) :
(∀(r00,i00) ∈ Ba(r0,i0) : (M,r00,i00 |= ψ))whichinturnisequivalentto∃(r00,i00) ∈
Ba
b(r,i) : M,r00,i00 6|= ψ. But this contradicts (R3): Ba
b(r,i) ⊆ [[ϕ]]. Moreover,
it cannot be the case that there is a γ ∈ Γ0
a such that Σ0
a |=PL γ. If that would be
the case then Ga
b(r,i) ⊆ [[♦γ]] and Ba
b(r,i) ⊆ [[γ]] which again contradicts (R1).
Case msg = ?ψ: Assume ψ is not a tautology and Σ0
a |=MS ψ. Then, M,r,i |=
BbBaψ and hence Bb
a(r,i) ⊆ [[ψ]], which contradicts (R3).
Case msg = !ψ: Beliefs are treated as in the previous case. Assume ψ is not a tau-
tology and Γ0
a 6|= ψ. Then also M,r,i 6|= BbGa♦ψ which is equivalent to
¬(∀(r0,i0) ∈ Bb : ∀(r00.i00) ∈ Ga(r0,i0) : M,r00,i00 6|= ♦ψ)andhence∃(r00,i00) ∈
Ga
b(r,i) : M,r00,i00 6|= ♦ψ. So we have that Ga
b(r,i) 6⊆ [[♦ψ]] which again con-
tradicts (R3).
Claim 2: ∀ϕ ∈ LV: t,i |=V ϕ iff M,t,i |= tr(ϕ)
This proof is straightforward by induction on ϕ.
ϕ = Bb
aφ:
t,i |=V Bb
aφ iff (t1(i))a |=MS Bbφ
iff {φ ∈ LPL | M,r,i |= BaBbφ} |=PL φ
iff M,r,i |= BaBbφ
ϕ = Gb
aφ:
t,i |=V Gb
aφ iff (t1(i))a |=MS Gbφ
iff {φ ∈ LPL | M,r,i |= BaGb♦φ}} |=PL φ
iff M,r,i |= BaGb♦φ

The theorems show that both the translation from LV to tr(LV) preserves truth given
that the modal semantics incorporates principles that match those in the computational
transition semantics.
The single agent part of the logic LM extends the logic discussed in [10], apart from a
few operators that were not introduced here due to space limits but which may be added
without much effort. The result presented here thus extends that of [10] to the multi-
agent case including communicative acts8. In particular, this means that we can relate
Cohen and Levesque’s Intention Logic in a similar way to LV as done with LM (modulo
communication). We do not claim, however, that the logic presented here corresponds
to that of [3].
8Apart from the [α] modality.
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6 Communicative Actions as Speech Acts
The logic LM provides us with the means to characterize various communicative actions
as instances of particular speech acts. Here, we will focus on such a characterization
by means of their associated sincerity and preparatory conditions from standard speech
act theory, which are combined into so-called feasibility preconditions in [8].
Remark 3 A remark about the language used is appropriate as LM is strictly more
expressive than tr(LV). The idea is that we translate a GOAL model to an LM-model to
be able to reason about various interpretations of communicative acts from an objective
perspective. Hence, it does not make sense to use formulae like BaBbBcϕ as mental
states do not contain related information. Formulae like Ba(Bbϕ ∨ Bb¬ϕ) 6∈ tr(LV)
may be used, however, as well as knowledge operators even though objective truth is not
provided by mental states; it is clear, however, that a source for objective truth can be
added to a MAS. The intuition is that (objective) truth is added to the translated GOAL
model afterwards. Moreover, it is straightforward how LV itself could be extended by a
truth layer (e.g. by adding an environment (agent)).
For example, in [8], the speech act conﬁrm has an associated feasibility condition
similar to Baφ ∧ Ba¬Bbφ where a is the sender, b the receiver and φ is the message
content. Similarly, the so-called rational effect of a conﬁrm is informally described as
an entitlement of the receiver "to believe that the sender believes the proposition that is
the content of the message.", which can be represented as BbBaφ.9
As a second example from [8], the speech act labeled inform has an associated feasi-
bility condition which can be represented by Baφ ∧ ¬Ba(Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ)10 whereas the
rational effect again may be represented by BbBaφ.
Although one can argue about such deﬁnitions, e.g. about the difference between
a conﬁrm and inform speech act, it is instructive to take these deﬁnitions as a starting
point to illustrate how LM can be used to characterize a communicative action as a
particular speech act. We ﬁrst characterize a set of speech acts which are all closely
related to the inform speech act as speciﬁed in [8].11
Deﬁnition 13 (Inform, Misinform, Lie)
Inform
b
aφ ::= °Donea(send(a,b,•φ))∧
Kaφ ∧ ¬BaBwhbφ ∧ °BbBaφ
Misinform
b
aφ ::= °Donea(send(a,b,•φ))∧
Baφ ∧ ¬φ ∧ ¬BaBwhbφ ∧ °BbBaφ
Lie
b
aφ ::= °Donea(send(a,b,•φ))∧
Ka¬φ ∧ ¬BaBwhbφ ∧ °BbBaφ
9[8] also uses an uncertainty operator which we have replaced with a negated belief operator. For reasons
not clear to us, in [8] the rational effect is represented by Bbφ.
10As above, [8] uses the belief modality as well as an uncertainty operator.
11Bwhφ is shorthand for Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ; Kwh is similarly deﬁned.
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The deﬁnitions of the three actions of informing, misinforming and lying only differ
with respect to minor but crucial details. We would argue that an agent a informs an-
other agent b of a fact φ only if agent a actually knows φ, i.e. a believes φ and φ is the
case. Similarly, agent a misinforms another agent only if a believes φ but φ is not the
case. Finally, agent a lies about φ to another agent only if a knows that ¬φ but nev-
ertheless communicates a declarative sentence φ to that agent. Each of the deﬁnitions
includeaconditionthatthereceivingagentbbelievesthatagentabelievesφ, whichcor-
responds with the rational effect associated with an inform action in [8] and the default
interpretation of the receiving agent of a declarative sentence built into the semantics.
Even though it may not be considered rational from a third-person perspective to come
to believe that the sender believes φ when the sender is lying, as long as an agent does
not have information to the contrary, we argued it is a reasonable interpretation strategy
to come to believe so upon receiving a declarative sentence.
Typically, only the ﬁrst act labeled inform will be present in speech-act based ap-
proaches such as FIPA and there is no room for actions that may be best characterized
as misinforming or lying. Although it seems very sensible to try to prevent actions that
may be classiﬁed in the latter ways, we would argue that it may be hard to ensure this
without the proper means to reason about communicative actions. Instead, we argue
that using speech acts to reason about communicating agents is more useful than to
use speech act labels as part of a communicative message sent to another agent. The
work presented is a step towards providing the logical tools to do so in a setting that
also provides the means to engineer a multi-agent system, which shows that the logic is
computationally grounded.
We provide some additional illustrations related to an agent that is querying about a
proposition φ.
Deﬁnition 14 (Query, Exam Query, Rethorical Query)
Query
b
aφ ::= °Donea(send(a,b,?φ))∧
¬Kaφ ∧ BaKwhbφ ∧ °Bb¬Baφ
ExamQy
b
aφ ::= °Donea(send(a,b,?φ))∧
Kwhaφ ∧ ¬BaKwhbφ ∧ °Bb¬Baφ
RethQy
b
aφ ::= °Donea(send(a,b,?φ))∧
Kaφ ∧ BaKwhbφ ∧ °Bb¬Baφ
The differences between a proper query, an exam query, and a rhetorical query again
are minor but crucial.12 A message ?φ is properly labeled a query when the sender does
not know φ but believes the receiving agent b does know whether φ, whereas it may
be considered an exam query when the sender knows whether φ but does not believe
that the receiving agent does too. Finally, a rhetorical query is similar to a proper query
except for the fact that the sender knows φ.
12In [8] the feasibility condition associated with the query-if speech act includes a condition that the
sending agent does not believe that the receiving agent already intends to inform the sender, a condition we
cannot express in the language LV.
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7 Conclusion
We introduced a computational semantics for agents that communicate at the knowl-
edge level [12] and a logic to reason about communicating agents that may be used to
characterize the message exchanges between agents. Messages are used to reconstruct
a model of the sender, which also ensures the autonomy of the receiving agent as that
agent’s beliefs and goals are not directly affected while the mental model of the sender
still may be used to further the agent’s goals.
[5] seems to shift the burden to implement a speech-act based semantics to the pro-
grammer, as they require so-called practical reasoning rules to process received mes-
sages. [16] also proposes a shift from sender to receiver in a communication semantics
for AgentSpeak(L). The approach is event-driven, however, and does not provide a
declarative semantics based on mental models nor a logic to reason about communica-
tive actions.
The expressiveness of the logic to reason about communicating agents is limited
compared to other logics that have been proposed [14, 3], and remains an issue for fu-
ture research, but an advantage of our approach is that it is based on a computational se-
mantics for communication that has typically been missing in pure logical approaches.
We believe nevertheless that it is useful to investigate various ways to increase the ex-
pressiveness of the language. The recent work presented in [9] on an extension of the
GOAL programming language such that a temporal logic can be used as the knowledge
representation language may be one interesting option to pursue in future work to do
so.
Finally, although in the semantics proposed here agents internalize the meaning of
messages, there are interesting links with social commitment semantics [2], and it may
be useful to integrate the dynamics of commitments at a social level with our agent-
based semantics.
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